Temporal and spatial distribution of global mitigation cost: INDCs and equity by Liu, J.-Y. et al.
This content has been downloaded from IOPscience. Please scroll down to see the full text.
Download details:
IP Address: 88.128.80.223
This content was downloaded on 03/11/2016 at 15:02
Please note that terms and conditions apply.
You may also be interested in:
Will international emissions trading help achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement?
Shinichiro Fujimori, Izumi Kubota, Hancheng Dai et al.
The contribution of Paris to limit global warming to 2 °C
Gokul C Iyer, James A Edmonds, Allen A Fawcett et al.
Carbon budgets and energy transition pathways
Detlef P van Vuuren, Heleen van Soest, Keywan Riahi et al.
2 °C and SDGs: united they stand, divided they fall?
Christoph von Stechow, Jan C Minx, Keywan Riahi et al.
Mitigation choices impact carbon budget size compatible with low temperature goals
Joeri Rogelj, Andy Reisinger, David L McCollum et al.
Zero emission targets as long-term global goals for climate protection
Joeri Rogelj, Michiel Schaeffer, Malte Meinshausen et al.
Impact of the choice of emission metric on greenhouse gas abatement and costs
Maarten van den Berg, Andries F Hof, Jasper van Vliet et al.
Temporal and spatial distribution of global mitigation cost: INDCs and equity
View the table of contents for this issue, or go to the journal homepage for more
2016 Environ. Res. Lett. 11 114004
(http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/11/11/114004)
Home Search Collections Journals About Contact us My IOPscience
Environ. Res. Lett. 11 (2016) 114004 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/11/114004
LETTER
Temporal and spatial distribution of global mitigation cost: INDCs
and equity
Jing-Yu Liu1,3, Shinichiro Fujimori1,2 andToshihikoMasui1
1 Center for Social and Environmental SystemsResearch,National Institute for Environmental Studies, 16-2Onogawa, Tsukuba, Ibaraki,
305-8506 Japan
2 International Institute for Applied SystemsAnalysis, Schlossplatz-1, Laxenburg 2361, Austria
3 Author towhomany correspondence should be addressed.
E-mail: liu.jingyu@nies.go.jp
Keywords:Paris Agreement, INDC, climate change, equity,mitigation cost, CGE
Supplementarymaterial for this article is available online
Abstract
Each country’s IntendedNationallyDeterminedContribution (INDC) pledges an emission target for
2025 or 2030.Here, we evaluated the INDC inter-generational and inter-regional equity by comparing
scenarios with INDC emissions target in 2030 andwith an immediate emission reduction associated
with a global uniform carbon price using Asian-Paciﬁc IntegratedModel/Computable General
Equilibrium. Both scenarios eventually achieve 2 °C target. The results showed that, as comparedwith
an immediate emission reduction scenario, the inter-generational equity status is not favorable for
INDC scenario and the future generation suffersmore fromdelayedmitigation.Moreover, this
conclusionwas robust to thewide range of inequality aversion parameter that determines discount
rate. On the other hand, the INDC scenario has better inter-regional equity in the early part of the
century than does the immediate emission reduction scenario inwhichwe assume a global carbon
price during the period up to 2030.However, inter-regional equity worsens later in the century. The
additional emissions reduction to the INDC in 2030would improve both inter- and inter-regional
equity as compared to the current INDC.We also suggest that countries should commit tomore
emissions reductions in the follow-up INDC communications and that continuous consideration for
low-income countries is needed for global climate change cooperation after 2030.
1. Introduction
In the IPCC’s ﬁfth assessment report (AR5) [1],Work-
ingGroup III noted several scenarios corresponding to
the 450 ppm CO2 equivalent concentration stabiliza-
tion. These scenarios mostly have immediate GHG
emissions reductions, andCO2 emissions become zero
or negative in the latter half of this century. The Paris
Agreement reafﬁrmed that the ultimate climate goal is
the 2 °C target, which corresponds to about 450 ppm
CO2 equivalent concentration stabilization in 2100
[2]. In addition, each country is to submit an Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) pledge
of emission targets for 2025 or 2030. The summation
of all countries’ submitted emission targets in 2030 is
expected to be larger than the least-cost 2 °C scenarios
shown in AR5, leading to a projected level of 55
GtCO2eq in 2030. To achieve the 2 °C target, an
additional emission reduction of approximately 15
GtCO2eq will be required to ﬁll the gap between the
post-INDC trajectory and the least-cost 2 °C scenarios
after 2030 [2].
The spatial and temporal distribution of mitiga-
tion costs would be different in a mitigation scenario
consistent with the INDCs and achieving the 2 °C tar-
get and in the least-cost 2 °C scenarios. This difference
implies that the INDCs inﬂuence equity both inter-
generationally and inter-regionally.
The discount rate used in projections has a notable
inﬂuence on the conclusions and policy implications
of generational equity issues. Social cost of carbon var-
ies with discount rate and people have conﬂicting opi-
nions about the urgency for the need for climate policy
depending on the discount rate [3]. There have been
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discussions about how to determine the discount
rates. The IPCC’s second assessment report [4] sum-
marized two major approaches of discounting future
values, namely the prescriptive and descriptive
approaches. The former begins with ethical considera-
tions, whereas the latter begins with evidence from
decisions that people and governments actually make.
AR5 [1] looked deeper into the prescriptive approach
and reviewed the use of the Ramsey rule of discount-
ing. AR5 concluded that a relative consensus has
emerged in favor of setting the pure rate of time pre-
ference at 0 and the inequality aversion parameters
somewhere from 1 to 3. The role of the pure rate of
time preference and inequality aversion in the dis-
count rate calculation will be explained in
section 2.3.1.
Several studies have examined numerical INDC
assessment. For example, Iyer et al [5] compared
INDC scenarios with an alternative emissions path in
which nations cannot undertake mitigation within the
INDC period. They found that the use of INDCsmade
important contributions towards achieving the 2 °C
target. Meinshausen et al [6] assumed onemajor emit-
ting economy would take the lead in the international
emission allocation scheme as an INDC approach and
the results showed that there would be a large gap
between what emission target was required for this
leading country and its current INDC pledge. Fawcett
et al [7] studied Paris pledges from a probabilistic per-
spective and found that INDCs contribute both to
reducing the risks of severe outcomes of global warm-
ing and to increasing the probability of limiting warm-
ing to 2 °C. However, no studies have yet focused on a
quantitative generational equity assessment of the
INDC and post-INDC time intervals. AR5 also sum-
marizes the effects on the mitigation cost due to
delayed mitigation action (WG3 SPM, table 2).
Obviously, emissions reductions in a former period
contribute to a reduction of the mitigation costs in a
later period. Kober et al [8] and Tavoni et al [9] cover,
to some extent, the issue of different mitigation costs
across regions under LIMITS projects [10]. Although
these studies provide meaningful scientiﬁc knowledge
with regard to mitigation cost distribution and policy
suggestions, their scenario frameworks are stylized for
an analysis of 2020 climate action and not for 2030 or
for the INDCs.
To address this gap, we attempted to answer three
research questions. (1) Does the use of INDCs lead to
more mitigation costs for future generations as com-
pared with the least-cost 2 °C scenarios presented in
AR5? (2) How do the INDCs affect inter-regional
equity? (3) Does greater reduction of emissions in
INDCs help to improve generational equity? Here, we
have chosen to focus on the 2 °C goal as a climatemiti-
gation target. However, older generations might
change this climate goal if they realize that the cost of
mitigation is larger than the beneﬁt. For this reason,
we have framed the paper’s focus as clearly policy rele-
vant (Paris Agreement).
Section 2 presents the model we used and the sce-
nario framework. The analytical method applied to
analyze the results derived from the model is also
introduced. Section 3 presents the model results for
some of the main indicators and the results for the
inter-generational and inter-regional equity analysis.
In section 4, we discuss the interpretations and impli-
cations of the results, limitations of the study, and
futurework in this area.
2.Methodology
2.1. Asia-Paciﬁc IntegratedModel/Computable
General Equilibrium (AIM/CGE)
We used AIM/CGE, which has been widely used in
climate mitigation and impact assessment [11–15].
AIM/CGE is a recursive dynamic general equilibrium
model that includes 17 regions and 42 industrial
classiﬁcations. Energy sectors, including power sec-
tors, are disaggregated in detail. Moreover, to assess
bioenergy and land use competition appropriately,
agricultural sectors are also highly disaggregated [16].
This CGE model was developed based on the ‘Stan-
dard CGE model’ [17], and details of the model
structure and mathematical formulas are described in
the AIM/CGEbasicmanual [18].
The production sectors are assumed to maximize
proﬁts undermulti-nested constant elasticity substitu-
tion (CES) functions and each input price. Energy
transformation sectors input energy and value added
as ﬁxed coefﬁcients of output. They are treated in this
manner to appropriately deal with energy conversion
efﬁciency in the energy transformation sectors. Power
generation values from several energy sources are
combined with a Logit function. This method is adop-
ted in consideration of energy balance because theCES
function does not guarantee a material balance.
Household expenditures on each commodity are
described by a linear expenditure system function. The
saving ratio is endogenously determined to balance
saving and investment, and capital formation for each
good is determined by a ﬁxed coefﬁcient. The Arming-
ton assumption is used for trade, and the current
account is assumed to be balanced.
In addition to energy-related CO2 emissions, CO2
from other sources, CH4, and N2O are treated as GHG
emissions in this model. Non-energy related CO2
emissions consist of land use change and industrial
processes. CH4 has various sources, but themain sour-
ces are the rice production, livestock, fossil fuel
mining, and waste management sectors. N2O is emit-
ted by fertilizer applications and livestock manure
management, as well as by the chemical industry.
Energy-related emissions are associated with fossil fuel
consumption and combustion. Non-energy-related
emissions, other than land use change emissions, are
2
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assumed to be in proportion to the level of activities
(i.e., output). Land use change emissions are derived
from the difference of forest land area from that of the
previous yearmultiplied by the carbon stock density.
The implementation of mitigation is represented
by either a global emissions constraint or country-
level emission constraints. A carbon tax is employed to
meet the global or country-level emission constraints,
and it is therefore either globally uniform or variable
across regions, depending on the type of constraint.
The carbon tax makes the price of fossil fuel goods
higher when emissions are constrained and promotes
energy savings and the substitution of fossil fuels by
lower emission energies and also acts as an incentive to
reduce the non-energy-related emissions. Gases other
than CO2 are weighted by global warming potential
and summed as GHG emissions in CO2 equivalents.
The revenue from the carbon tax is assumed to be
received by households.
2.2. Scenarios
Table 1 outlines the four scenarios simulated in this
study: Baseline, 450CO2e, INDC_450CO2e, and
SINDC_450CO2e. The baseline scenario entails no
emissions constraints and follows current trends in
energy technologies. The 450CO2e scenario includes
emissions constraints that approximately meet the
emission radiative forcing target of 2.6–2.8Wm−2 in
2100, which can be interpreted as being in the range of
the 2 °C target. The scenario employs a uniform global
carbon price subject to particular emission targets
discussed later. The INDC_450CO2e scenario also
meets a similar radiative forcing target. INDC pledges
are satisﬁed before 2030. The resulting gap between
INDC_450CO2e and 450CO2e in cumulative CO2
emissions prior to 2030 is addressed by further
reducing emissions from the 450CO2e emission
trajectory after 2030 in INDC_450CO2e. The
SINDC_450CO2e scenario is similar to the
INDC_450CO2e scenario, but the INDC target for
each country is 20% higher as compared with the
target in INDC_450CO2e. The emissions pathway
after 2030 is determined in the same manner as in the
INDC_450CO2e scenario. The mathematical method
of determining the emissions pathways can be found
in the supplementary material (SM). The details of
how to construct an emissions constraint in 2030 are
also shown in SM; other socioeconomic policies, such
as renewable energy targets, are not treated in this
study. However, the energy system responds to the
carbon price associated with the chosen emissions
constraints.
The simulation period is 2005–2100. The socio-
economic assumptions behind all of the scenarios fol-
low shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP2) [19]
socioeconomic assumptions. Socioeconomic assump-
tions generally include assumptions not only on
demographics and economic scale but also on other
aspects, such as changes in energy technologies and
dietary preference changes. The resultsmight be sensi-
tive to the SSP socio-economic assumptions. Here
SSP2 is used as it is seen to be the continuing of the
current social, economic and technological trend,
leaving the world face moderate challenges to mitiga-
tion and adaptation [19]. Population and gross
domestic product (GDP) growth are assumed to be the
same as in Samir and Lutz [20] and Dellink et al [21]
and are presented in the SM. Other energy, land use,
and agricultural assumptions are based on Fujimori
et al [22]. Countries are grouped into three regions:
developing countries, industrial countries, and trans-
ition countries. The regional deﬁnitions are presented
in the SM.
2.3. Analyticalmethods
After we obtained the scenario results, we analyzed the
mitigation costs with respect to generational equity.
Here, consumption loss or its rate is treated as a
representative metric of mitigation costs. To make
current and future mitigation costs comparable for
inter-generation comparisons and to be able to
aggregate the costs across time for both inter-genera-
tional and inter-regional analyses, a discount rate is
introduced.
We made three types of analysis in section 3. First,
we divided the years 2020–2100 into two generations
to analyze inter-generational equity. The current gen-
eration was deﬁned as 2020–2060 and the future one
as 2060–2100. Then, we compared the net present
value (NPV) of both generations in terms of absolute
consumption loss in the various scenarios. Using the
discount rate, we converted future mitigation costs
Table 1. Scenario descriptions.
Emissions constraints
Before 2030 After 2030
Radiative forcing in
2100 (Wm−2)
Baseline No emission constraints 7.28
450CO2e Global emission constraint 2.86
INDC_450CO2e Each country’s emission constraint Global emission
constraint
2.83
SINDC_450CO2e Each country’s emission constraint+additional
emission reduction
Global emission
constraint
2.79
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into an equivalent present value for 2020 and aggre-
gated the values. The second and third are for inter-
regional equity by evaluating the relationship between
the consumption loss rate and GDP per capita across
regions in each year as well as their average values for
the entire period.
2.3.1. Ramsey rule and the discount rate
The discount rates were determined by equation (1)
based on theRamsey rule [23]:
r d h= + ( )g . 1t,r t,r
Here rt,r is the discount rate at time t for region r, andd is the pure rate of time preference for the present.We
assumed that the pure rate of time preference was 0
following the practice of previous studies [24, 25],
because there is broad consensus for a zero or near-
zero pure rate of time preference for the present [1].
The parameter gt,r is the consumption growth rate in
region r, and h can be viewed as a measure of
intertemporal inequality aversion [26–29]. AR5 [1]
explained h with the following thought experiment.
Imagine an economic policy the aim of which is to
increase consumption by 1 unit for every person in a
poor group by reducing consumption for every
wealthy person by x units. The maximum value of x
that a personwould accept to implement the policy is a
metric of that person’s inequality aversion. Values of
1–3 were often used for inequality aversion, with 2
being the most common value [1, 30]. This implies
that the x from the thought experiment ranges from 2
to 8. Arrow et al [30] suggested that h reﬂects the
maximum sacriﬁce one generation should make to
transfer income to another generation.
Figure 1 shows how the discount rate varies over
time with different values of inequality aversion in
Baseline. The discount rates are almost the same across
scenarios since the GDP loss is small enough to change
discount rates signiﬁcantly. More detailed consump-
tion growth rates and discount rates in different
regions and scenarios are presented in the SM. All of
the curves show a declining trend after 2020.
2.3.2. Equity principles
Three equity principles are operationalized in our
study. First, the use of a discount rate involves equity.
The discount rate is determined on the basis of
people’s inequality aversion, as noted above. Different
inequality aversion values are used in the analysis, and
their effects on the results are discussed. Second, inter-
generational equity was measured by the mitigation
cost for current and future generations. In our
calculations, we assumed that equity was improved
once the relative difference of the NPVs of both
generations’ consumption losses decreased. Finally,
inter-regional equity was measured by mitigation cost
differences and, here, consumption loss rate is used as
an indicator ofmitigation cost.
3. Results
3.1.Main indicators4
3.1.1. GHG emissions
Figure 2 shows the emission paths for the Baseline,
450CO2e and INDC_450CO2e scenarios. Tomeet the
2 °C target, the 450CO2e scenario assumes a gradually
declining global emission path. Total global emissions
are 48.9 GtCO2eq in 2020 and 8.76 GtCO2eq in 2100.
In the INDC_450CO2e scenario, each country’s emis-
sions between 2020 and 2030 are consistent with its
INDC pledge. After 2030, the gap in cumulative CO2
emissions from before 2030 as compared with emis-
sions in the 450CO2e scenario will be ﬁlled by
allocating additional emissions reductions to the latter
part of the period. After 2080, total global emissions
reach a lower limit and then remain steady.
Emissions in developing countries, transition
countries, and globally are greater in the
INDC_450CO2e scenario than those in the 450CO2e
scenario from 2020 to 2030, whereas they are about
the same in industrial countries. Industrial countries’
emissions increase slightly after 2030, primarily
because the global uniform carbon price after the
INDCperiod ismuch lower than it is during the INDC
period.
3.1.2. Carbon price
In the 450CO2e scenario, a uniform global carbon
price is assumed throughout the period. In the
INDC_450CO2e scenario, we set country-level carbon
prices from 2020 to 2030 and a uniform global carbon
price from 2030 to 2100. Carbon price climbed
dramatically after 2075 in the INDC_450CO2e sce-
nario (ﬁgure 3(a)), primarily because greater emission
reductions are required in the latter part of the century
and the marginal cost of emission reduction is rising.
Developing countries and transition countries have
lower carbon prices in the INDC_450CO2e scenario
than in the 450CO2e scenario from 2020 to 2030,
whereas industrial countries have higher prices
(ﬁgure 3(b)).
3.1.3.Mitigation cost
Figure 4 presents regional and global consumption
loss rates as an indicator of mitigation costs. Global
mitigation costs in the INDC_450CO2e scenario are
less than those in the 450CO2e scenario before 2060,
but they are higher afterwards. Because the discount
rate is not accounted for in theseﬁgures, themitigation
cost of the current and the future generations are not
comparable.
4
Here GHG emissions, carbon price andmitigation cost are shown.
The energy aspects such as primary energy supply and power
generation are shown in SM.
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Figure 1.Global and regional discount rates for inequality aversions of 1, 2, and 3 in the Baseline scenario.
Figure 2.Global and regional GHGemission paths for scenarios Baseline, 450CO2e and INDC_450CO2e. Theﬁgurewhich includes
SINDC is shown in SMﬁgure 6.
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3.2. Inter-generational equity
We calculated the NPV of consumption losses for the
current (2020–2060) and future (2060–2100) genera-
tions, as well as the relative differences between the
two generations in each scenario. The relative differ-
ence was calculated as (NPV of the current generation
−NPV of the future generation)/NPV of the future
generation. This difference reﬂects the relative gap in
mitigation costs between the two generations. Hence,
it is an indicator of inter-generational equity—smaller
values indicate greater inter-generational equity. It is
important to note that it is only the absolute value of
the relative difference that matters, not whether the
value is positive or negative.
Figure 5 shows the consumption losses for the
two generations and the relative differences between
the two generations’ global consumption losses. The
discounted consumption loss is lower in the current
generation and higher in the future in the
INDC_450CO2e scenario as compared with the
450CO2e scenario for all inequality aversion values.
The relative difference decreases as inequality aver-
sion increases in both scenarios, but the relative dif-
ference in the 450CO2e scenario is always lower and
approaches 0 when the inequality aversion is 3.
Except for the case when the inequality aversion is 3
in the 450CO2e scenario, both scenarios favor the
current generation over the future generation. In
addition, the INDC_450CO2e scenario always has
worse inter-generational equity, regardless of the
inequality aversion value. It should be noted that the
absolute difference is small when inequality aversion
is high, which will not be apparent in the relative dif-
ferences ﬁgure.
Figure 3. (a)Global carbon price through 2100 and (b) regional carbon price through 2040 for scenarios 450CO2e and
INDC_450CO2e. The ﬁgurewhich includes SINDC is shown in SM ﬁgure 7.
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3.3. Inter-regional equity
Figure 6 shows scatter plots for the NPV consumption
loss rates of the entire time period of 17 regions versus
GDP per capita for the 450CO2e and INDC_450CO2e
scenarios. We used the NPV consumption loss rate for
each region to represent the average mitigation cost
throughout the entire time period. The trend lines of
the scatter plots show the trend of the relationship
between income and mitigation cost for the different
scenarios. A negative sloping trend line indicates that
mitigation causes low-income countries to have higher
consumption loss rates. The slope of the trend line in
scenario INDC_450CO2e is more negative than that
of scenario 450CO2e when the inequality aversion is
small (i.e., 1). When the inequality aversion is 2 or 3,
the slope in the INDC_450CO2e scenario is greater
than that of the 450CO2e scenario. This occurs
because the impact of the latter part of the century
become less important to the NPV of the entire time
period when the discount rate is relatively high, and
the earlier part of the century ismore heavily weighted.
Focusing on the conﬁdence intervals (>95%) of
the slope parameters, the aversion 3 case is relatively
small (table 2) and there is no great overlap between
450CO2 and INDC450CO2e. Therefore, under the
assumption of equality aversion parameter 3, their dif-
ference is sufﬁciently large. However, it would be difﬁ-
cult to distinguish differences between these two
scenarios with small aversion parameters 1.
We also evaluated variations in inter-regional
equity over time from the regression parameters of the
inter-region scatter plots in different years (ﬁgure 7).
The discount rate is not used here. In the ﬁrst part of
the period, scenario INDC_450CO2e has better inter-
regional equity compared to scenario 450CO2e. After
about 2060, however, the situation is reversed. Focus-
ing on the conﬁdence intervals (>95%) of the slope
parameters in ﬁgure 7, in the early and late parts of this
century, i.e., before 2045 and after 2075, there is no
great overlap between the 450CO2e and
INDC450CO2e scenarios. Therefore, the slopes of the
curves differ signiﬁcantly. Between 2045 and 2075,
however, the conﬁdence intervals are large and we
could not distinguish the slopes of the curves in the
two scenarios.
We assumed a uniform carbon price across
regions for the entire period in the 450CO2e scenario
and from 2030 to 2100 in the INDC_450CO2e sce-
nario. A global carbon price would have a greater
adverse impact on low-income countries than on
high-income countries. Before 2030, INDC pledges
ensure that inter-regional equity improves because
low-income regions gain opportunities to develop
their economies by pledging lower emission reduc-
tions during this period. During this period, a uniform
carbon price in 450CO2e scenario harms the inter-
regional equity. The low-income countries continue
to beneﬁt from this economic development from 2030
to 2055 even though the global carbon price increases.
Thus, before 2060, inter-regional equity is better in the
INDC_450CO2e scenario, but the carbon price after
2060 becomes much higher in the INDC_450CO2e
Figure 4.Global and regionalmitigation costs for scenarios 450CO2e and INDC_450CO2e. Theﬁgurewhich includes SINDC is
shown in SMﬁgure 8.
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scenario than in the 450CO2e scenario, andmitigation
costs increase for the low-income countries. At this
point, the impact of the global carbon price becomes
dominant, and the INDC_450CO2e scenario per-
forms worse than the 450CO2e scenario in terms of
inter-regional equity.
3.4. Stringent INDC scenario analysis
In the SINDC_450CO2e scenario, we assumed each
region had more stringent INDC emission targets to
explore how it would affect inter-generational and
inter-regional equity. Increasing the emissions reduc-
tion target in the INDC period reduced the relative
difference of consumption losses between current and
future generations compared with the
INDC_450CO2e scenario (ﬁgure 8).
That the SINDC_450CO2e scenario has a regres-
sion line slope that is less negative than the slope of the
INDC_450CO2e scenario regression line when the
inequality aversion is below 2 (ﬁgure 9) indicates
greater inter-regional equity. This is primarily because
the carbon price is lower in SINDC_450CO2e than it
is in INDC_450CO2e, particularly in the latter half of
the century.
4.Discussion and conclusions
This study assessed inter-generational and inter-
regional equity based on the temporal and spatial
distribution of global mitigation costs using
AIM/CGE.
4.1. Interpretations and policy implications
There are four points to be discussed. First, we
observed that inter-generational equity was worse in
scenario INDC_450CO2e than it was in 450CO2e,
mainly because INDC_450CO2e has a limited
amount of emission reductions through 2030 and
postpones the reduction efforts into the future as
compared with 450CO2e. The inter-generational
equity status for the INDC and post-INDC emission
pathway is not favorable in this sense, because the
future generation suffers from the larger emissions
reductions required in the latter part of the century.
Figure 5. (a)Discounted consumption loss for two generations and (b) relative difference of consumption losses ([NPV current
generation−NPV future generation]/NPV future generation) for scenarios 450CO2e and INDC_450CO2e. 1, 2, and 3 represent
inequality aversion.
8
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This conclusion was robust for inequality aversion
parameters (i.e., implied discount rates) ranging
from 1 to 3. This would suggest that additional
emission reduction efforts in the near term are
desirable to achieve the 2 °C target from the view-
point of inter-generational equity.
Second, scenario INDC_450CO2e performs better
in terms of inter-regional equity during the entire per-
iod on average as compared with scenario 450CO2e if
the inequality aversion is large. Equity was deﬁned
such that high-income regions and low-income
regions have close consumption loss rates. Under this
principle, INDC_450CO2e has better inter-regional
equity in the early part of the century as compared
with that of 450CO2e in which a global carbon price is
assumed during the period up to 2030. However, this
is not the case for the latter part of the century because
of the drastic increase of mitigation costs in this
period.
Third, the modiﬁed INDC scenario, SINDC_450-
CO2e, had increased emission reductions prior to
2030. Inter-generational equity improved as com-
pared with INDC_450CO2e, although it still was
worse than inter-generational equity with 450CO2e.
Furthermore, its average inter-regional equity was also
better than that of INDC_450CO2e. The Paris Agree-
ment states that emissions targets will be reviewed and
revised in 2020 [2]. This implies that there is still room
to enforce stronger emissions reduction for 2030. Our
results indicate that each country should adjust its tar-
get and commit to greater emissions reductions in the
follow-up INDC communications.
Moreover, although we did not consider a spe-
ciﬁc burden-sharing scheme after 2030 in this study,
Figure 6. Inter-regional consumption loss accounted for asNPV for r scenarios 450CO2e and INDC_450CO2e, with inequality
aversions of 1, 2, and 3.
Table 2. Statistical parameters of the estimated slopes forNPV.
Inequality aversions Scenarios μ σ t value n
Conﬁdential
interval
Aversion 1 450CO2e −0.0463 0.0280 −1.6390 17 ± 0.0115
INDC450CO2e −0.0532 0.0350 −1.5172 17 ± 0.0133
Aversion 2 450CO2e −0.0230 0.0202 −1.1390 17 ± 0.0057
INDC450CO2e −0.0169 0.0235 −0.7158 17 ± 0.0042
Aversion 3 450CO2e −0.0072 0.0126 −0.5720 17 ± 0.0018
INDC450CO2e 0.0004 0.0136 0.0316 17 ± 0.0001
9
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we surmise from the inter-regional equity results
that a global uniform carbon price is relatively harm-
ful for developing countries. Considering inter-
regional equity, global carbon pricing should be
avoided. However, a global carbon price is the best
solution to achieve our climate goals efﬁciently.
Therefore, we may be better off if we ﬁnd inter-
mediate solutions. Also, it seems that ongoing con-
sideration for low-income countries will be needed
as part of global climate change cooperation
after 2030.
4.2. Limitations and future steps
There are four points with respect to limitations of this
study and future steps. First, the 21st Conference of
Parties (COP21) reached an agreement to pursue
efforts to limit the global temperature increase to
1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. How would the
status of generational equity change assuming we
follow the INDC pledges and the achievement of the
1.5 °C target by the year 2100? We have not yet
addressed this issue but regard it as a next step in our
study of equity in climate change policy.
Second, in this study we only considered distribu-
tion equity in terms of the distribution of global miti-
gation costs. Historical responsibilities, compensatory
justice, and other factors that may also be relevant to
the equity discussion [4] were not considered. For
example, many studies working on equity issues dis-
cuss cumulative emission allocation schemes [31–35],
which are not discussed in this paper. Meanwhile, a
focus of recent studies has been the emissions transfer
from developed countries to developing countries
through international trade [36–40]. This emissions
Figure 7.The slope of regressed parameters for each year through 2100 for scenarios 450CO2e and INDC450CO2e. Each
undiscounted year’s consumption loss rate was regressed for each year.
Figure 8.Mitigation cost comparison between current and future generations for inequality aversions of 1, 2, and 3 in scenarios
450CO2e, INDC_450CO2e, and SINDC_450CO2e. The deﬁnition of relative difference of consumption loss is the samewith that in
ﬁgure 5(b).
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accounting method is certainly relevant to the equity
debate, but it was not considered in this study.
Third, here we only considered mitigation costs,
negative impacts of climate change and adaptation
costs are obviously important elements of the genera-
tional equity issue. Although mitigation cost assess-
ment is a prioritized area in terms of INDCs and
emission reduction targets, impact and adaptation
aspects need to be considered in future studies.
Finally, we assumed that each year’s emissions
after 2030 were adjusted to ﬁll the gap between the
immediate emission reduction scenario and the INDC
emission targets during the INDC period. In future
studies, we may try to use an emission INDC pathway
derived from some type of intertemporal model, for
example, theDICEmodel.
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